Formal logic operates in a closed system where all the information relevant to any conclusion is present, whereas this is not the case when one reasons about events and states of the world. Pollard and Richardson drew attention to the fact that the reasoning behind statistical tests does not lead to logically justifiable conclusions. In this paper statistical inferences are defended not by logic but by the standards of everyday reasoning. Aristotle invented formal logic, but argued that people mostly get at the truth with the aid of enthymemes-incomplete syllogisms which include arguing from examples, analogies and signs. It is proposed that statistical tests work in the same way-in that they are based on examples, invoke the analogy of a model and use the size of the effect under test as a sign that the chance hypothesis is unlikely. Of existing theories of statistical inference only a weak version of Fisher's takes this into account. Aristotle anticipated Fisher by producing an argument of the form that there were too many cases in which an outcome went in a particular direction for that direction to be plausibly attributed to chance. We can therefore conclude that Aristotle would have approved of statistical inference and there is a good reason for calling this form of statistical inference classical.
Introduction
There are a variety of forms of statistical inference, but all involve the following characteristics: observations are made, a probability is computed, and a conclusion is drawn. The first part of this paper is concerned with arguing that all probabilities and the models on which they are based are subjective and open to improvement by taking account of additional relevant information. The consequences of this for statistical inference are then discussed. Probability calculations are based on deductive logic as they involve deriving necessary conclusions from sufficient assumptions. Such calculations are too inflexible to incorporate effects that had not been foreseen when their initial assumptions were formulated. Making statistical inferences involves reasoning on the basis of incomplete information and does not lead to necessary conclusions. This paper is about developing a theory of how statistical tests work that incorporates inconclusive reasoning. Deductive reasoning does play a part-hence the value of probability reasoning-but only a part, in the process. There is a link between the practice of statistics and rhetoric (Abelson, 1995) . Aristotle in his Rhetoric held that, where the relevant information is incomplete, one approaches the truth by debating the point at issue using a variety of types of inconclusive argument which he called enthymemes (Ross, 1966) . In what follows it will be argued that statistical reasoning is based on enthymemes.
2. The incompleteness of probability reasoning Fisher (1956) introduced the idea of a completely specified probability model. Such models take account of all the information relevant to the occurrence of events whose probabilities are specified. Completeness depends on there being no identifiable subsets of events which can be associated with different probabilities but which are not distinguished in the model. Complete probability models are ideal in the sense that they cannot be improved on by taking account of additional information. Furthermore, if a probability model is not complete then it can be improved. De Finetti (1972) had the same idea when he postulated sets of equivalent events which cannot be distinguished in ways affecting the probabilities of their outcomes. Where sets of equivalent events exist, probabilities based on frequencies of occurrence are complete in Fisher's sense. Such ideal models are theoretically nice because they imply the existence of correct probabilities such that if one were to bet on the basis of any other probabilities then one would lose in the long run. Unfortunately it is never possible to demonstrate that a particular model is complete, or that two or more events are equivalent, as it is not possible to consider all the ways of distinguishing between events. Thus whenever a complete model is postulated there is always doubt regarding its completeness. Future evidence may always demonstrate that any model is incomplete.
I take probabilities to be based on analogies with urn models. Assuming there are large numbers of hypothetical equally likely chances, a probability is the ratio of the number of chances associated with an event happening to the number of chances associated with its either happening or not happening. Incompleteness arises because analogies are by nature imperfect (Macdonald, 2000) . As a result, all probabilities are open to the challenge that the model on which they were based should have incorporated some additional factors.
Since all probabilities ignore potentially relevant information and statistical testing involves reaching conclusions on the basis of probabilities, it follows that all statistical tests ignore potentially relevant information unless they can take account of more than just the probabilities. Bayesians complain that statistical tests ignore the prior views of researchers regarding the likelihood of the hypotheses under test, but they themselves ignore concerns about the accuracy of the data, the adequacy of the procedures used and the competence of the researchers. In addition, statistical tests also ignore features of the data themselves. For example, statistical tests of differences between groups are less to be trusted where the shapes of the distributions of the data in two groups are not identical, and this is especially so if the number in one of the groups is small. Exploratory data analyses to determine unexpected features of the data are often recommended but when such an unexpected feature is found it is often unclear exactly how any particular statistical test should be affected. The interpretation of statistical tests in the presence of outliers is a case in point. Data sets also provide information on the variety of alternative tests that might have been performed and hence indicate the extent to which the test selection could have influenced the p-values obtained. Moreover, data may contain systematic trends that have a bearing on whether the effect under test could plausibly be attributed to sampling error (Barlow, Bartholomew, Bremner, & Brunk, 1972) .
A less well-known way in which data provide additional information over and above that used by a statistical test comes from the amount of sampling error that is present. Fisher supposed that the t-value in a one-sample t test contained all the information in the data relevant to whether or not the null hypothesis was true, assuming the underlying probability model was correct. This is not so, as the standard deviation can provide information over and above the t-value concerning whether an effect is present or not (Macdonald, 2002) . Given two t-values of the same size, there is more likely to be an effect present where the standard deviation is larger than when it is smaller. This may be of little use where the two tests involve different measurement scales, but it could be taken into account where the scales are the same or where unexpectedly large or small variability is found (Macdonald, 2002) . What follows from this is that the interpretation of p-values should be open to modification in the light of arguments that suggest that other factors need to be taken into account.
These limitations of probabilities have implications for all forms of statistical inference. Inferential reasoning in statistics involves reaching conclusions about the way the world is on the basis of observations and probability models. There are two main forms of inferential reasoning-null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) and Bayesian inference. NHST involves inferring from a set of data that the direction of an observed difference cannot plausibly be attributed to chance because if it were the observed size of the difference is unlikely. Bayesian inference involves computing the probabilities of various states of the world in the light of some new observations given the prior probabilities of these states together with the probabilities of obtaining the observations given these states. The incompleteness of probability models affects both forms of inference in ways outlined below.
Bayesian inference
Bayes' theorem describes how the probability of states of the world should be updated in the light of evidence and it has been suggested that it is the standard for how knowledge should be acquired, since scientific knowledge develops as scientists modify their beliefs in the light of evidence (Howson & Urbach, 1993) . The mathematics of Bayes' theorem is uncontroversial but its applicability is an enduring controversy in statistics. Bayes' theorem states that the probability of the state of the world s j given an observation o i is the unconditional probability of s j multiplied by the probability of o i given s j divided by an expression which equals the unconditional probability of o i . The equation is given below:
Where concern is with just two states (s j and s k ), the ratio of the posterior probabilities given by equation (1) yields
from which it can be seen that the relative probabilities of two states are updated in the light of a new observation o i by multiplying the relative probabilities by the likelihood ratio of the observation given each of the states. Equation (2) suggests a simplification known as the likelihood principle-that the likelihood ratio is all one needs to know regarding the updating of probabilities in the light of observation o i (Edwards, 1992) . Bayes' theorem is based on deductive logic (Popper & Miller, 1987) . It depends on given premises and determines what these premises imply. In order to apply Bayes' theorem one specifics the possible states of the world being considered (s j ), their probabilities ( p(s j )), the possible values of the observations (o i ) and the conditional probabilities of the observations given the states ( p(o i js j )). For Bayes' theorem to apply, the probabilities of all distinguishable combinations of states and observations are determined from the products of the p(s j ) and the p(o i js j ). That is, the probabilities of all the cells in Table 1 must be known. All Bayes' theorem does is that when an observation o i is observed then all the rows involving other observations are eliminated and the probabilities of the states of the world in the remaining row are rescaled so as to sum to one. Bayes' theorem simply models the elimination of preconceived possible outcomes whose probabilities are known in advance.
There have been objections to Bayes' theorem. Hacking (1967) noted that it assumes that the observations which update the probabilities are known with certainty, and Schum made a similar point, arguing that if further evidence could cast doubt on whether o j was accurate or not then the likelihood principle was either wrong or irrelevant (Edwards, Schum, & Wrinkler, 1990) . However, the problems facing Bayes' theorem are more serious than this. In Bayesian reasoning the ways of classifying the states of the world and the possible observations must be assumed together with the probabilities associated with these classifications. In practice there is always uncertainty regarding anything that is supposed, and unforeseen occurrences can always undermine probability models. Yet Bayes' theorem has nothing to say about how its premises are formed or how they may be modified in the light of observations (Popper & Miller, 1987) . What is premised is true with a probability of one and prior probabilities of one and zero are not modifiable in Bayesian reasoning.
Null hypothesis significance testing
In previous papers I have defended what I called the weak (non-fiducial) Fisherian version of NHST (Macdonald, 1997; 2002) . According to this theory of statistical 
inference, the aim of a statistical test is to determine whether the direction of an observed difference can plausibly be attributed to chance. This is assessed by calculating a p-value-the probability of obtaining the observed difference or a bigger one, assuming some model of chance. An effect is said to be statistically significant when this p-value is so small that it is held to be implausible that such a difference could have arisen by chance. All effects tested in statistical tests are differences, and the conclusions of a statistical test can be presented in the form that the direction of the difference under test can or cannot plausibly be attributed to chance. The p-value follows by deductive logic from the observed difference and the model of chance posited, but this does not mean that the conclusions should do so as well. A p-value should be seen as a guide, but the decision on whether to conclude that a particular difference could or could not plausibly be due to chance should take into account Neyman and Pearson (1933) , supposes that by basing one's experimental design on a power analysis as well as controlling for type 1 errors (making an error by falsely concluding that an effect is present) one can also control type 2 errors (making an error by failing to conclude that an effect is present when it is). This approach involves accepting that an effect is present when significance at a predetermined level is achieved and accepting that no non-negligible effect is present when a test is not significant. Neyman-Pearson testing works in the following way. The sample size is determined so as to ensure a power of at least P when the significance level is a and a difference of d (the largest effect deemed to be negligible) is present. A number of conclusions follow by deductive reasoning once it is assumed that the probability distribution of the difference under test is known except for its location. Firstly, over a long run of tests the relative frequency of obtaining a significant result when the sign of the observed difference is due to chance is less than or equal to a. This is because the relative frequency is a when the population difference is 0 and it decreases as the population difference increases. Secondly, over a long run of testing differences the relative frequency of obtaining a significant result, where the sign of the difference is not due to chance, is equal to P when a population difference of d is present and more than P if the population difference is greater than d. These relative frequencies correspond to the probabilities of getting significant effects when no effect is present and getting a significant difference in the correct direction when an effect of d is present only where there is no other relevant information to take into account. The case for following the Neyman-Pearson procedures depends on the absence of additional information that the sign of the difference under test is due to chance.
The incompleteness of probability models has a more drastic effect on NeymanPearson testing than it does on weak Fisherian testing because Neyman-Pearson testing relies on the rigid acceptance of hypotheses regardless of what else is known to be relevant. There is no need for the inflexibility of Neyman-Pearson testing. A priori power analyses are called into question when there are suggestions in the data that they were based on false premises and the possibility of having missed potentially important effects because of a lack of power is better evaluated with confidence intervals than with power analyses (Hoenig & Heisey, 2001; Macdonald, 2002) . While determining sample sizes based on power analyses may be a good idea, it is not essential, as significant findings from low-powered tests are still meaningful and may be important. Contrary to what has been supposed (see, for example, Gigerenzer, 1993), Fisher had no objection to basing sample sizes on power analyses (Kruskal, 1980) . What Fisher objected to in Neyman-Pearson theory was the rigid acceptance of hypotheses (Fisher, 1956 ).
Statistical tests, logic and inconclusive arguments
From what has been said it is clear that statistical tests do not lead to necessary conclusions, and this implies that statistical tests are not entirely based on deductive logic. Pollard and Richardson (1987) criticized logical characterizations of statistical tests using the argument below.
The following reasoning (R 1 ) is logically sound:
therefore not A However, R 2 is not: Clearly this reasoning is fallacious, and if NHST depended on it NHST would be discredited. Pollard and Richardson (1987) made it clear that they were not attacking the use of statistical tests but the way they had been characterized. Cohen (1994) recycled Pollard and Richardson's arguments in a much more direct attack on the use of statistical tests. He stated that the reasoning behind statistical tests that appears 'implicitly in article after article and explicitly in some statistics textbooks' is R 3 . He called this 'the illusion of attaining improbability'. There is a need for an alternative explanation of the way NHST works. What follows is an attempt to provide this, based on a mixture of Fisherian and Aristotelian reasoning. Aristotle invented logic, in the sense that he was the first to provide a systematic treatment of correct inference (Smith, 1995) . However in his Rhetoric he held that deductive logic is rarely useful in reasoning where only some of the relevant information is available (Franklin, 2001 ). In everyday reasoning there is uncertainty concerning which premises should be postulated and how events should be categorized. Premises and categorizations are always open to challenge, and deductive logic does not deal with such problems. The substance of Aristotle's Rhetoric has been taken to be a set of techniques for persuasion regardless of the truth of the matter in question (see Corbett, 1965) . In a book on the relevance of rhetoric to social psychology, Billig (1996) links Aristotle's rhetoric with sophistry. His theme is a maxim of Protagoras, a prominent sophist, that there are two sides to every question. This is not how Aristotle presented rhetoric. He was contemptuous of sophistry and considered that people could and should debate issues in order to arrive at the truth. While arguments can be made on many sides of any issue, they are not usually equally good. Aristotle was concerned with rhetoric as a means of demonstrative proof even if it was of a lower standard than that offered by deductive logic. Aristotle stated that rhetoric is concerned with ways of determining what is true (and just) , that truth has a natural tendency to prevail over its opposite in debate, and that by and large people usually arrive at truth. His subject was inconclusive arguments (because there is no alternative) but he was no sceptic. Where rhetoric fails he goes so far as to hold this to be the fault of its practitioners (Ross, 1966 (Ross, , p. 1355a ). In the Rhetoric Aristotle considers how to find and organize source material about particular issues so that people can attain the truth as best as they can. This is the way rhetoric works. Sometimes the truth is straightforward-Pólya (1954) describes how mathematicians discover mathematical truths using methods similar to Aristotle's rhetorical techniques-and sometimes it is not- Billig (1996) is an attempt to get closer to the truth about social psychology which turns out to be much more complex than the social psychologists of 1950s and 1960s thought. For a classical scholar's defence of the view that Aristotle's Rhetoric is about ways of determining truth, see Grimaldi (1972) .
Aristotle held that the unit of debate was the enthymeme. A passage in Rhetoric (quoted in Ross, 1966 Ross, , p. 1402b This definition is incomplete. Aristotle's Rhetoric lists many different types of enthymemes, which include the use of signs, examples, analogies and induction, for use in everyday reasoning. Enthymemes are incomplete or weakened syllogisms-for example, where a premise is missing or where one or more premises are replaced by probability statements or where assertions are made which can be accepted without proof (called maxims). Enthymemes include arguing that A is a Y because A 0 (which is similar to A) is a Y or that A is a Y because A is an X and most X are Y. Any use of probabilities depends on an enthymeme involving an analogy. To say that the uncertainty associated with some event X occurring is equal to a probability of p ¼ a=ða þ bÞ is to say that this uncertainty is equivalent to the uncertainty in a model where there are a equally likely chances of X occurring and b equally likely chances of X not occurring. However this equivalence can never be perfect because there is uncertainty surrounding the accuracy of any description which is external to the description itself. Probabilities are descriptions of uncertainties. It follows that there is uncertainty about the accuracy of any probability that is not incorporated into the probability itself. Moreover, correcting the probability cannot resolve the problem because the corrected probability is also a description which itself may be inaccurate (Macdonald, 2002) . To put the problem differently, there is no room in a probability model for uncertainty concerning anything that is postulated (Popper & Miller, 1987) . What this means is that probability theory cannot take account of the quality of the analogy that lies behind every probability model, but people interpreting the results of probability modelling can and should.
Justifying statistical tests
The reasoning behind statistical tests can be justified using a mixture of Aristotelian and Fisherian reasoning. A key part of the argument is that the size of the difference under test is a fallible sign that the direction of that difference is not due to sampling variability. Hacking (1965) reports that Fisher's justification of statistical tests boils down to the following: when a low p-value is achieved one is faced with the disjunction that 'either an exceptionally rare chance has occurred, or the theory of random distribution is not true' (Fisher, 1956, p. 42) . Under these circumstances it seems reasonable to conclude that the null hypothesis is false. This could be expressed as follows. However, Hacking (1965) went on to argue that Fisher's disjunction had no force at all because the chance probability of an effect depends on how the effect is described. If the effect is continuous it can be described as being in any interval that contains it and by an appropriate selection of intervals its probability under the null hypothesis can be made to equal anything at all. Clearly something more than Fisher's disjunction is needed. Statistical tests have no impact where the effect under test is not a sign that the effect has not arisen by chance. Consider the following example. Suppose someone buys a ticket in a lottery, where 100 tickets each with an equal chance of winning were sold, and goes on to win the first prize. This could be expressed as a statistical test against the alternative hypothesis that this person cheated to ensure that he or she won. Such a test would achieve a significance level of 0.01 but in itself the test provides no grounds for concluding that the lottery was unfair, regardless of the number of tickets sold and the resulting value of p. It would be different if the winner had an opportunity to cheat that was not available to the other players or where there were prior suspicions that the winner would cheat before the raffle took place, but nothing can be made of a low p-value arrived at by testing the null hypothesis against the supposition that the winner cheated where there is no other evidence that cheating took place. The force of a statistical test depends not only on Fisher's disjunction and the improbability implied by H 0 but also on the extent to which it can be argued that the effect under test is a sign that the null hypothesis is false. An effect is a sign that the null hypothesis is false if the probability of its occurrence is greater when the null hypothesis is false than when it is true. Statistical tests can be justified along the following lines: R 6 1: If A ðthe direction of a difference d is due to chanceÞ; then the probability of B ða difference sized d or moreÞ is very small ðthe p-value or lessÞ in a probability model taking account of such and such factors: 2: If not A then the probability of B is larger ðthe p-value or greaterÞ in the same probability model: 3: Suppose B occurred and p is very small: It follows that either ðiÞ A and an improbable event according to the model or ðiiÞ not A:
4: Therefore; in the absence of any information not included in the probability model which could account for the size of the difference; it is reasonable to suppose not A:
Statistical tests work where a large difference is a sign that this difference has not arisen as a result of uncontrolled variation in a particular study. In the Congressman example R 4 , being an American is a sign of being in Congress, not the other way round. A statement equivalent to R 6 (1) can be made-'If A ( X is an American), then the probability of B ( X is a member of Congress) is very small (the p-value or less) in a probability model taking account of such and such factors'-but there is no equivalent statement to R 6 (2) because if not A then the probability of B is smaller than the p-value if we know that only Americans can be members of Congress. The reasoning in the Congressman example differs from the reasoning in statistical tests because B is a sign for A in the Congressman example whereas B is a sign for not A in NHST. The Congressman example does not invalidate statistical testing; it simply shows that some characterisations of statistical testing are inadequate. NHST is a form of inconclusive reasoning based on probabilities.
Up to now it has been argued that, in addition to formal probability reasoning, the conclusions from statistical tests should depend on Aristotelian rhetorical techniques, but a stronger claim can be made. Statistical tests can be performed without the aid of p-values, probability models or any formal probability reasoning at all. They were performed around 2000 years before probability was invented. Discussing the relationship between the speed of a star moving in a particular orbit and the size of the orbit, Aristotle argued in On the Heavens (quoted in Ross, 1966, p. 289b): If, on the other hand, the arrangement was a chance combination, the coincidence in every case of a greater circle with a swifter movement of the star contained in it is too much to believe. In one or two cases it might conceivably turn out so, but to imagine it in every case alike, is a mere fiction. Franklin (2001) reports that Aristotle, Ptolemy and Cicero all used this form of reasoning. He surmises that the origins of statistical tests are lost somewhere amongst the precursors to classical scholarship. Clearly these ancient scholars approved of the reasoning behind weak Fisherian significance testing and there is good reason for referring to this form of statistical testing as classical.
Conclusions
Classical statistical inference involves reasoning on the basis of incomplete information and yields p-values that should be interpreted taking into account whatever relevant factors one can identify that the test has not taken into account. Similarly, the conclusions from Bayesian analyses depend on the quality of their models, and NeymanPearson testing is suspect because it controls for failing to detect large effect sizes at the expense of being insensitive to relevant information.
Aristotle, who invented logic, saw the enthymeme as the principal tool of reasoning where the relevant information is incomplete. All probability reasoning depends on the following enthymeme. The uncertainty associated with some event X occurring is like the uncertainty in a model where there are a equally likely chances of X occurring and b equally likely chances of X not occurring. Therefore the uncertainty of event X is the probability a=ða þ bÞ: Reasoning from probability models involves reasoning on the basis of an analogy. This means that while the conclusions arrived at from probabilities can be regarded as optimal within the analogy, more generally their value depends on the quality of the analogy and analogies are never perfect. Arguing about the nature of these analogies can suggest new ways of classifying data, call into question the assumptions behind particular analyses, and result in more sophisticated statistical inferences. Arguing about the world is a way of deepening one's understanding of it.
